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STOPPING THE BANDIDOS: PASQUANTINO
AND THE PROSECUTION OF TAX FRAUD IN LATIN AMERICA
JAIME GUTTMAN
INTRODUCTION
Usually, private litigants who obtain a judgment from a foreign court can seek
enforcement of that judgment in the United States legal system. 1 Foreign judgments are
presumptively valid and enforceable, and the party opposing U.S. enforcement bears the burden
of proving why the court should not enforce the foreign judgment. 2 However, this rule does not
apply to the enforcement of foreign tax obligations. 3 Instead, under the common law revenue
rule, U.S. courts may not enforce other nations’ tax and revenue laws.
Enter Carl and David Pasquantino, two brothers who were prosecuted in the United
States under the federal wire fraud statute for smuggling liquor into Canada to avoid Canadian
excise taxes. In their defense, the Paquantinos invoked the revenue rule by claiming that the
United States government “lacked a sufficient interest in enforcing the revenue laws of
Canada.” 4 The United States Supreme Court, considering the interplay between the revenue rule
and the wire fraud statute, concluded that “a plot to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue
violates the federal wire fraud statute . . . .” 5
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1
William J. Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: an Argument for the Revocation of the Revenue
Rule, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 265, 266 (2000). The general rule of enforceability of foreign judgments exists
independent of any international treaty; rather, foreign judgments generally are recognized under the doctrine of
international comity. Id.
2
Id. at 266.
3
Id. at 267.
4
Pasquantino v. U.S., 544 U.S. 359, 125 S.Ct. 1766, 1770 (2005) (Pasquantino III)
5
Id.
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But plots to defraud governments of tax revenue include activities even more common
than smuggling. Tax evasion is a crime, and one that occurs in countries all over the world. If
the activities that constitute foreign tax evasion occur in the United States with the use of
interstate wires, then foreign tax evasion may constitute a violation of the federal wire fraud
statute.
In Part I, this article considers the legal and international climate in which the
Pasquantino decision was made, including consideration of the scope of tax evasion in Latin
America. Part II of this article analyzes the Pasquantino decision in detail, including a
presentation of the facts, the underlying proceedings, and a summary of the Supreme Court
decision. Part III of this article considers whether, and to what extent, Pasquantino will be
helpful in addressing the problem of tax evasion in Latin American countries.
I.

TAX EVASION AND THE REVENUE RULE

By definition, tax evasion is “the willful attempt to defeat or circumvent the tax law in
order to illegally reduce one's tax liability.” 6 As a practical matter, tax evasion can occur when a
taxpayer lies about his income and when a taxpayer hides income and structures transactions so
that the taxpayer’s government is unaware of that income.
A.

Tax Evasion in Latin American in the 21st Century
Despite the fact that the “tax culture in Latin America has matured” over the past few

years, and the level “of brazen tax evasion has declined substantially,” 7 tax evasion remains a
common problem in the region. 8 Tax evasion results, in part, from a lack of national consensus

6

Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
Peter D. Byrne, Foreign Tax Problems of U.S. Companies Doing Business in Latin America, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV.
483, 484 (1996).
8
C. Gruben, The United States and the Future of Free Trade in the Americas, 6 NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV. AM. 457,
460.
7
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regarding the proper expenditure of the collected revenues 9 combined with a culture of deep
political corruption and mistrust for the government.
New tax systems have been put into place in several Latin American countries, helping to
reduce tax evasion. 10 Among these new tax systems’ features are lower tax breaks, which have
helped create a more stable economic environment and helped generate lower inflation rates, and
improved infrastructure. 11 However, these measures have not completely resolved the tax
evasion issue, resulting in fraud levels above those found in developed countries including the
United States. 12
Tax evasion thus remains a common problem in Latin America. 13 The extent of the
evasion, the techniques used, and the level of local enforcement, varies from country to country.
Several reasons help explain why tax evasion is such a prevalent problem in Latin America, but
those issues are beyond the scope of this writing. 14 This article will focus on the possible
foreign-political implications of the availability of the United States judicial system to assist in
foreign tax-law enforcement. 15
One way to evade taxes is through the investment of monies overseas, usually in tax
havens but also in developed countries with large economies. Income is derived from such

9

Id.
Byrne, supra note 7, at 484.
11
Id.
12
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 1573 (2000)
13
Id. at 1584.
14
See Gruben, supra note 8, at 460 (stating that“[t]he tax evasion problem appears to result from a lack of national
consensus as to appropriate tax or expenditure levels, a problem whose roots are easy to understand in a context of
income, and wealth inequalities.”).
15
“These problems, however, create a tension or ‘political fiscal gap’ politicians promise to close when
campaigning for office and often fail to fulfill upon election.” Id. (citation omitted).
10
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investments, not subject to tax by the host country and not, usually, declared in the country of
citizenship. 16
According to Avi-Yonah, “Latin American countries provide a prime example: after the
enactment of the portfolio interest exemption, 17 about $300 billion fled from Latin American
countries to bank accounts and other forms of portfolio investment in the United States.” 18
Provided that these funds arrived in the United States via wire transfers, or pursuant to telephone,
fax or email communications, between the foreign national and the U.S. bank, the transaction, if
intended to create undeclared which is untaxed income, to evade foreign tax, could be construed
as subject to §1343 prosecution for wire fraud. 19
B.

The Revenue Rule
According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States,

“[c]ourts in the United States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the
collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of other states.” 20 This principle is
widely known as the “revenue rule” and has been present in the common law system since it was
first enounced by Lord Mansfield in the case of Holman v. Johnson in 1775. 21 In that case a
French seller of tea sued his English buyer in England to recover the purchase price of the
16

Avi-Yonah, supra note 12, at 1576 (“individuals can generally earn investment income free of host-country
taxation in any of the worlds major economies.”).
17
Id. at 1579-580 (emphasis added). (“In 1984, the United States unilaterally abolished its withholding tax of 30%
on foreign residents who earned portfolio interest income from sources within the United States. n4. ‘Portfolio
interest’ was defined to include interest on U.S. government bonds, on bonds issued by U.S. corporations (unless the
bondholder held ten percent or more of the shares of the corporation), and on U.S. bank accounts and certificates of
deposit. n5. This ‘portfolio interest exception’ is available to any nonresident alien (that is, any person who is not a
U.S. resident for tax purposes) and does not require any certification of identity or proof that the interest income was
subject to tax in the investor’s country of residence.”
18
Id. at 1584-85.
19
Another possibility not explored in this paper is the making of these deposits from cash sources. Given the
tightening of anti-money-laundering laws, including bank-reporting regulations, it is very unlikely that nowadays
this scenario would be prevalent. Additionally, those types of transactions usually involve “dirty” funds that have to
be “laundered,” implicating another host of law violations not covered by this paper.
20
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §483 (1987). [hereinafter “Restatement (Third)”].
21
Restatement (Third), supra note 20, at Reporters’ Notes 1 (citing Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.
1775)).
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contract. 22 The English buyer argued in his defense that that contract was illegal because the tea
was to be smuggled into England without paying English duties. The English court held in favor
of the French plaintiff, “on the ground that he had committed no immoral act, for revenue rules
are only positive and not moral law; and he could not have committed a criminal act, for he had
acted only in France, and ‘no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another.” 23 This
famous quote by Lord Mansfield has been applied in later cases in which government authorities
have sought to enforce tax claims or foreign judgments based on tax claims. 24
The revenue rule reflects a “reluctance of courts to subject foreign public law to judicial
scrutiny, combined with reluctance to enforce law that may conflict with the public policy of the
forum state.” 25 This rule also reflects an inherent mistrust of foreign criminal procedures. 26 In
the criminal context, “[e]ven where those procedures have by implication been recognized to be
adequate, e.g., where a state has signed an extradition treaty with another state, there has been no
disposition to enforce penal judgments of the other state.” 27 Of course, despite the similarities in
policy, “the considerations concerning foreign tax judgments are different from those for penal
judgments.” 28
Judge Learned Hand justified the revenue rule as necessary to avoid the examination of
the revenue laws and policies of other nations by U.S. courts. 29 Moreover, courts generally can
refuse to recognize and enforce foreign judgments, citing public policy concerns and reasoning

22

Id.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at Reporters’ Note 2.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Kovatch, Jr., supra note 1, at 277.
23
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that enforcement would entail a review of foreign tax policy that might cause serious
embarrassment to the foreign nation. 30
Although the revenue rule remains alive today, as acknowledged by the court in
Pasquantino, some authors have called for its abrogation.31 However, as a practical matter,
Pasquantino illustrates that the aspect of the revenue rule dealing with the enforcement of foreign
tax claims has been abrogated by the majority of the Supreme Court by allowing the indirect
enforcement of the Canadian claim. 32
II. THE PASQUANTINO DECISION: A WARNING TO WOULD-BE FOREIGN TAX EVADERS?
A.

Background: Pasquantino Arrives at the Supreme Court
Prior to 1996, the Canadian government increased its sin taxes on alcohol and cigarettes

to levels that greatly exceeded comparable United States taxes. 33 As a consequence, a Canadian
black market emerged when unscrupulous entrepreneurs began smuggling alcohol and cigarettes
into Canada without paying the required import taxes. 34 David and Carl Pasquantino
(collectively “Defendants” or “Petitioners”), residents of Niagara Falls, New York, began to
exploit this market by purchasing large quantities of liquor from discount stores in Maryland and
smuggling it into Canada. 35 The defendants paid all required U.S. federal and state taxes on the
liquor when they bought it in the United States, but paid no Canadian taxes on the liquor when

30

Id.
For example, Kovatch calls the revenue rule “an anachronism in American law,” and argues that its rationale is
“suspect.” Id. at 287.
32
See Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005); see also infra.
33
United States v. Pasquantino (Pasquantino I), 305 F.3d 291, 292 (4th Cir. 2002).
34
Id. at 292-93.
35
Id. at 293.
31
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they smuggled it into Canada. 36 The Pasquantinos began this scheme in 1996 and ran it until
May 2000. 37
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“BATF”) discovered that some retail
stores in Maryland were placing unusually large orders with distributors. 38 Two of the retail
store owners cooperated with BATF agents by recording telephone conversations and advising
BATF when the Pasquantinos called or visited the stores. 39 U.S. authorities then contacted the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police and jointly monitored the Pasquantinos’ operations in the
United States and in Canada. 40 The Pasquantinos and their associates were arrested and indicted
in the United States. 41 Two of these associates eventually testified against the Pasquantinos. 42
The defendants were indicted on six counts of wire fraud. The federal wire fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. §1343, prohibits the use of interstate wires to conduct “any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises.” 43 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that a scheme to defraud a
foreign government of tax revenue was not actionable under the wire fraud statute 44 and that
accrued tax revenue did not constitute property under the statute. 45 The district court denied the
motion and the case went to trial. At trial, the government’s case included the testimony of a
seventeen-year veteran Canadian Customs employee who explained that the Canadian tax on the

36

Id.
Id.
38
Pasquantino I, 305 F.3d at 293.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
18 U.S.C § 1343 (2005).
44
Pasquantino I, 305 F.3d at 293.
45
United States v. Pasquantino (Pasquantino II), 336 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2003).
37
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liquor was twice what a consumer would pay for the liquor itself in the United States. 46 The jury
convicted the defendants of wire fraud.
The defendants appealed their convictions to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
claiming that “their prosecution contravened the common-law revenue rule, because it required
the court to take cognizance of the revenue rules of Canada.” 47 The panel reversed the
conviction, holding that, although Canadian taxes can be property for purposes of a wire fraud
charge, the revenue rule precluded this prosecution. 48 The government successfully sought
rehearing en banc and, on rehearing, the Fourth Circuit reinstated the convictions. 49
On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit examined the history behind the revenue rule and sided
with the Second Circuit, deepening a circuit split. 50 The Second Circuit, faced with an
essentially identical scheme, 51 held the revenue rule inapplicable and ruled that the wire fraud
statute did not preclude prosecution of a scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax
revenue. 52 In contrast, the First Circuit had vacated convictions where the defendants had been
convicted of wire fraud for their participation in a scheme, using interstate wires, to defraud
Canada of duties and tax revenues due on imported tobacco. 53 The First Circuit had reasoned
that “upholding defendants’ section 1343 conviction would amount functionally to penal
enforcement of Canadian customs and tax laws.” 54 The First Circuit also had noted that

46

Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d at 326.
Id.
48
Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d at 326.
49
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1771.
50
Id. at 331 (citing United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997).
51
Id.
52
United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 551 (2d Cir. 1997).
53
United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 583 (1st Cir. 1996).
54
Id. at 587.
47
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“[w]here a domestic court is effectively passing on the validity and operation of the revenue laws
of a foreign country, the important concerns underlying the revenue rule are implicated.” 55
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit case and resolve the
circuit split.
B.

Pasquantino v. United States: The Supreme Court Opinion
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court 56 joined by Justices Stevens,

O’Connor, Kennedy and Rehnquist. Justice Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion joined by
Justices Breyer and, in parts II and III, by Justices Scalia and Souter. 57
The Court first concluded that the defendants’ conduct fell within the terms of the wire
fraud statute, notwithstanding any impact of the revenue rule. The wire fraud statue prohibits
using interstate wires to effect “any scheme or artifice to defraud or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises.” 58 According to
the majority, the defendants’ smuggling operations satisfied the two elements of the crime, (1)
that the defendant engage in a “scheme or artifice to defraud[;]” 59 and (2) that the “object of the
fraud…be [money or] property’ in the victim’s hands.” 60 The first prong of the statute, the
scheme or artifice to defraud Canada of duties and taxes, was uncontroverted, so only the
property requirement was in dispute.
The Court relied on its own precedent to conclude that “Canada’s right to uncollected
excise taxes on the liquor petitioners imported into Canada is ‘property’ in its hands.” 61 The

55

Id.
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1769.
57
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1769.
58
Id. at 1771 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000)).
59
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1771.
60
Id.
61
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1771 (citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)); see, e.g., Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 125, S.Ct 377 (2004).
56
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Court also cited Blackstone 62 and the common law definition of fraud, both of which include
depriving a victim of entitlement to money. 63 Finally, the Court noted that “the fact that the
victim of the fraud happens to be the Government, rather than a private party, does not lessen the
injury.” 64
After disposing of the property question, the Court turned its attention to the revenue rule,
concluding that the revenue rule did not preclude the Pasquantinos’ prosecution. The commonlaw revenue rule—that courts will not enforce the tax laws of another sovereign—is first defined
as the corollary of the rule that “[t]he courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.” 65
In a two-part analysis, the Court first considered the revenue rule as it was understood when the
wire fraud statute was enacted and then examined the purposes of the revenue rule.
The Court began its consideration of the common-law revenue rule by examining the
rule’s meaning as of 1952, the year Congress enacted the wire fraud statute at issue in this case. 66
The Court sought evidence that the revenue rule would have barred prosecution under the statute
at the time the statute was enacted because, the Court reasoned, only that evidence would prove
Congressional intent to exempt the present prosecution from the broad reach of the wire fraud
statute. 67 The Court concluded that as of that date there were no common-law cases that held, or
clearly implied, that the “revenue rule barred the United States from prosecuting a fraudulent

62

Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1772, (“The right to be paid money has long been thought to be a species of
property.”); see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES 153-155 (1768) (classifying a right to sue on a debt as
personal property).
63
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1772 (“For instance, a debtor who concealed his assets when settling debts with his
creditors thereby committed common-law fraud.”).
64
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1772. In so holding, the Court distinguished Cleveland v. United States, 521 U.S. 12
(2000). In Cleveland, the Court had found that a State’s interest in an unissued poker license was not property
because the State’s interest in choosing licensees was not economic, but rather “purely regulatory.” In contrast, the
Pasquantino III Court noted that “Canada could hardly have a more ‘economic’ interest than the receipt of tax
revenue.”
65
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct.at 1774 (citing The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123 (1825).
66
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1774.
67
Id.
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scheme to evade foreign taxes.” 68 In discerning legislative intent, the Court disregarded all cases
that had been decided after 1952. 69
The majority then examined the “common-law principle that crimes could only be
prosecuted in the country in which they were committed,” 70 and analogized foreign revenue laws
to foreign penal laws. A number of cases support the proposition that the common-law revenue
rule forecloses a prosecution similar to that of Pasquantino because such a prosecution indirectly
enforces foreign revenue laws. However, the Pasquantino majority viewed the domestic conduct
of the defendants as the reason for their prosecution. 71
The Court described the Pasquantino case as one of sovereign enforcement of the
“sovereign’s own penal law,” 72 and rejected the argument that the Pasquantino prosecution’s true
purpose was the collection of foreign tax claims, an improper purpose under the revenue rule.73
Rather, here, the “link between this prosecution and foreign tax collection [was] incidental and
attenuated at best, making it not plainly [a case] in which ‘the whole object of the suit is to
collect tax for a foreign revenue’.” 74
Further, the revenue rule never banned all enforcement of foreign revenue law. 75 Rather,
in decisions dating back to the 18th century, courts, by voiding certain contracts, effectively

68

Id. at 1773 (emphasis added). “The traditional rationales for the revenue rule, moreover, do not plainly suggest
that it swept so broadly. Id.
69
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1776 (in support of a broad reading of the revenue rule to exclude the non-collection
of taxes and enforcement of other laws by a foreign government).
70
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1774.
71
Id .(The prosecution here was unlike the classic examples of actions traditionally barred by the revenue rule. It
was not a suit that recovers a foreign tax liability, like a suit to enforce a judgment. This was a criminal prosecution
brought by the United States in its sovereign capacity to punish domestic criminal conduct.).
72
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1776 (Moreover, the court added “A prohibition on the enforcement of foreign penal
law does not plainly prevent the Government from enforcing a domestic criminal law.”) (emphasis in original).
73
Id. at 1777.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1778.
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enforced the revenue laws of other states. 76 Courts also had required the satisfaction of foreign
taxes due out of property of a decedent’s estate. 77 The Pasquantino Court concluded that
“[t]hese cases demonstrate that the extent to which the revenue rule barred indirect recognition of
foreign revenue laws was unsettled as of 1952.” 78 Hence, the Court continued, Congress could
have intended courts to enforce the wire fraud statute, even if doing so would incidentally
recognize Canadian revenue laws. 79
The Court also grappled with the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 80 which
required that the United States government actually collect these taxes on behalf of Canada.
Faced with this apparent conflict, the Court first suggested that such “enforcement” would be
merely incidental, and then concluded that “the proper resolution would be to construe the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act not to allow such awards, rather than assume that the later
enacted restitution statute impliedly repealed §1343 as applied to frauds against foreign
sovereigns.” 81
Defending its decision against the critique that it improperly gave extraterritorial effect to
the wire fraud statute, the Pasquantino Court stated that “[u]nlike the treaties and the
antismuggling statute [cited by the defense], the wire fraud statute punishes fraudulent use of

76

Pasquantino III, 125 S. Ct. at 1778 (citing Alves v. Hodgson, 101 Eng. Rep. 953 (K.B. 1797), Clegg v. Levy, 170
Eng. Rep. 1343 (N.P. 1812))..
77
Id. (citing In re Hollins, 139 N.Y.S. 713, 716-17 (Sur.Ct.) aff’d 144 N.Y.S. 1121 (1913); aff’d 212 N.Y. 567 (App.
1914)) (“While it is doubtless true that this court will not aid a foreign government in the enforcement of its revenue
laws, it will not refuse to direct a just and equitable administration of that part of an estate within its jurisdiction
merely because such direction would result in the enforcement of such revenue laws.” Id. at 717.).
78
Pasquantino III, 125 S. Ct. at 1778.
79
Id.
80
18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A-3664 (2000 ed. And Supp. II) (“(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when
sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the court shall order, in addition to, or in
the case of a misdemeanor, in addition to or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make
restitution to the victim of the offense or, if the victim is deceased, to the victim's estate.” Id.).
81
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1777.
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domestic wires, whether or not such conduct constitutes smuggling, occurs aboard a vessel, or
evades foreign taxes.” 82
The Court stressed the domestic nature of the offense for which the defendant was being
punished, noting that the defendants’ crime “was completed the moment they executed the
scheme inside the United States.” 83 Finally, the Court also pointed out that “[i]n any event, the
wire fraud statute punishes frauds executed ‘in interstate or foreign commerce,’ 84 so this is surely
not a statute in which Congress had only ‘domestic concerns in mind.’”85
The Pasquantino Court also opined that its ruling neither would intrude on the interests of
the other branches of the government nor would damage foreign relations. 86 Citing the
traditional concern that courts lack competence interpreting foreign law, especially “unfamiliar
foreign tax schemes,” 87 the Court conceded that “[w]ithout proof of foreign law, it is impossible
to tell whether the scheme had the purpose of depriving the foreign corporation or individual of
valuable property interest as defined by foreign law.” 88 Because, however, the District Court
had before it “uncontroverted testimony of a Government witness that [Defendants] scheme
aimed at violating Canadian tax law,” the court found no “unmanageable complexity” here. 89
Moreover, the Court noted that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for the
interpretation of foreign law. 90 Concededly, the Pasquantino prosecution required a court to

82

Id. at 1773.
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1780 (“[t]his domestic element of petitioners’ conduct is what the Government is
punishing in this prosecution, no less than when it prosecutes a scheme to defraud a foreign individual or
corporation, or a foreign government acting as a market participant.”.).
84
Id. at 1780-81 (citing 18 U.S.C §1343).
85
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1781 (citing Small v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1752, 1755 (2005)).
86
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1779 (“The present prosecution creates little risk of causing international friction
through judicial evaluation of the policies of foreign sovereigns”).
87
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1780.
88
Id. at 1781 n.13..
89
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1780.
90
Id.
83
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“recognize foreign law to determine whether the defendant violated U.S. law.” 91 However, the
Court stressed that this action was brought by the Executive branch of the government, the
branch in charge of international relations. 92 Thus, allowing the prosecution imposes no risk of
intruding on the executive’s power over international relations. 93 Further, by combining the
previous point with the fact that the prosecution was brought pursuant to a wire fraud statute
enacted by Congress, the Court characterized this case as one that “embodies the policy choice of
the two political branches of our Government--Congress and the Executive--to free the interstate
wires from fraudulent use, irrespective of the object of the fraud.” 94
The majority carefully bracketed the question of whether its holding should extend to the
situation in which a foreign government, based on the wire or mail fraud predicate offense,
brought a civil action based on RICO 95 for a scheme to defraud it of taxes. 96
C.

The Pasquantino Dissent
The dissent opined that the common-law revenue rule does not allow a reading of the

wire fraud to allow a prosecution charging, in effect, that the revenue laws of another country
have been violated. 97 Additionally, the dissent argued, the majority would wrongly give the wire
fraud statute extraterritorial effect. 98

91

Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1779.
Id. (citing United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)(“[The Executive branch] is the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations”)); Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604
(2d Cir. 1929)(“and has ample authority and competence to manage ‘the relations between the foreign state and its
own citizens’ and to avoid ‘embarrass[ing] its neighbor[s]’”)).
93
Id. (“But we may assume that by electing to bring this prosecution, the Executive has assessed this prosecution’s
impact on this Nation’s relationship with Canada, and concluded that it poses little danger of causing international
friction.”).
94
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1780.
95
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (2006).
96
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1771 cf. Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268
F. 3d 103, 106 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding that the government of Canada cannot bring a civil RICO suit to recover for
a scheme to defraud it of taxes); Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., 341 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir.
2003)(same with respect to other foreign governments).
97
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98
Id.
92
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The dissent defined the common-law revenue rule as the principle that “one nation
generally does not enforce another’s tax laws.” 99 Indeed, the dissent argued that the revenue rule
was implicated in this case because the court had to recognize foreign tax law “to determine
whether the defendant violated U.S. law,” as charged in the indictment. 100 The dissent rejected
the argument that the enforcement was only “attenuated,”101 stating instead that the defendant’s
conduct arguably fell within the scope of §1343 only because of their purpose to evade Canadian
customs and tax laws; shorn of that purpose, no other aspect of their conduct was criminal in this
country.” 102
Justice Ginsburg buttressed the argument by examining the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act of 1996. 103 The Government acknowledged that: “[it] did not urge the district
court to order restitution in this case on the theory that it was not ‘appropriate… since the victim
is a foreign government and the loss derives from a tax law of the foreign government.’” 104
Justice Ginsburg concluded that, when this statute and the wire fraud statute are read
together, it is clear that Congress did not intend the statute to apply to cases like this. 105
The dissent argued that the holding by the majority would extend the wire fraud statute
beyond the prosecution of domestic crimes, and improperly give it extraterritorial effect. The
dissent noted the existence of laws and treaties designed specifically to deal with transnational,
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100
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Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1787 (citing to Brief for the United States 19-20).
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criminal activities, none of which apply to these particular facts. 106 For example, 18 U.S.C.
§546, provides “for criminal enforcement of the customs laws of a foreign nation only when that
nation has a reciprocal law criminalizing smuggling into the United States…[c]urrently, Canada
has no such reciprocal law.” 107
The dissent acknowledged that the Court has read the wire fraud statute expansively in
the past, extending it to “everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or
present, or suggestions and promises as to the future.” 108 But Justice Ginsburg noted that the
Court has also recognized the need for careful analysis to prevent “dramatically expand[ing] the
reach of federal criminal law,” as in McNally v United States, where the Court declined to extent
the reach of the mail fraud statute beyond congress expressed intent.109 In particular, she cited to
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (“Aramco”) 110 which held that “Congress, in most of its
legislative endeavors, ‘is primarily concerned with domestic conditions,” 111 and argued that this
concern should apply to construing the wire fraud statute, criticizing the majority for giving it
“such extraordinary extraterritorial effect.” 112 It argued that, the inclusion of “foreign
commerce” in the statute, “does not in itself indicate a congressional design to give the statute
extraterritorial effect.” 113 The dissent recognized that §1343 has been properly applied to
schemes to defraud a foreign governments acting as a market participant, or foreign individuals
106

Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1782.
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108
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1784 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313
(1896).
109
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1784 (refusing to construe 18 U.S.C. §1341, the mail fraud statute, to reach
corruption in local governments, stating: “[W]e read §1341 as limited in scope to the protection of property rights. If
Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has”) (citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 360 (1987)).
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499 U.S. 244 (1991).
111
Pasquantino III, 125 S.Ct. at 1785 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“common sense notion” that Congress ordinarily
intends statutes to have only domestic application) (citing Small v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1752 (2005)); ([T]his
Court ordinarily does not read statutes to reach conduct that is “the primary concern of a foreign country” (citing
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or corporations, but contended that those situations were distinguishable as they did not
necessarily depend on any determination of foreign law. 114
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg explained that the prosecution here had to rely on proof that
Canadian laws had been broken in order to prosecute and convict under 18 U.S.C §1343. 115
Additionally, the penalty imposed relied on Canadian customs and tax laws because it reflected
the amount defrauded from the Canadian Government. 116 The dissent also emphasized that the
information regarding the violation of Canadian laws was provided by an “intelligence officer
with Canadian Customs,” who testified “based on her experience in working at the border.” 117
Justice Ginsburg also noted that “[t]he Customs officer was not offered as an expert witness and
‘[t]he [D]istrict [C]ourt never determined whether [her] calculations were accurate as a matter of
Canadian law.’” 118
The dissent noted that Congress has enacted specific statutes for the prosecution of
offenses of the type committed by the defendants. 119 None of these statutes apply, however, to
the defendant’s specific activities. The most relevant statute, the anti-smuggling statute, 120 is
conditioned by the other country’s reciprocity with the United States. 121 “The reciprocity
limitation reflects a legislative determination that this country should not provide other nations
with greater enforcement assistance than they give to the United States.” 122
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Similarly, the dissent noted that a comprehensive tax treaty exists between the United
States and Canada, under which both nations have committed to provide collection assistance
with respect to each other’s tax claims. 123 The treaty only applies to adjudicated tax liabilities,
thus eliminating the problem of each country interpreting the other’s tax laws. Furthermore, the
treaty would not apply to this case since it “bars assistance in collecting any claims against a
citizen, corporation or ‘the requested state.’” 124 In the conclusion to this section of her analysis,
Justice Ginsburg stated that she “would not assume that Congress understood §1343 to provide
the assistance that the United States, in the considered foreign policy judgment of both political
branches, has specifically declined to promise.” 125
In analyzing the question of the relation between the tax treaty and the proper
interpretation of §1343, the dissent referred to the tax treaties of which the United States is a
party as set forth in the Second Circuit case of Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Holdings, Inc. 126 This case was brought by the Canadian government, which sought to
use United States civil processes to collect taxes which, it alleged, had been evaded by
smuggling. The dissent recognized the risks that such actions might be permitted under the
majority’s holding in conflict with the principle of avoiding extraterritoriality and the revenue
rule. Instead, it suggested actions where the Pasquantinos should be dealt with by specific
established means such as tax treaties or extradition to stand trial in Canada.” 127
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Finally, the dissent noted that wire fraud “is a predicate offense under the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 128 and the money laundering statute.” 129 A
“finding that particular conduct constitutes wire fraud therefore exposes certain defendants to the
severe criminal penalties and forfeitures provided in both RICO… and the money laundering
statute.” 130 As highlighted by Reynolds, this could extend to civil RICO actions as well.
III.

PASQUANTINO: A NEW WEAPON IN THE OLD FIGHT AGAINST TAX EVASION?

Given the large Latin American population traveling to the United States, it is not beyond
the realm of possibility that many could be subject to Pasquantino-type prosecutions. Consider
the following hypothetical scenario: a Venezuelan citizen who resides in Venezuela travels to the
United States to conduct several financial transactions. Among these transactions is the opening
of a brokerage account investing in high-yield securities. This individual provides all the
required proof of non-U.S. residency to prevent local taxation. However, she does not intend to
report the earnings in Venezuela, effectively depriving the Venezuelan government of taxes due.
According to Pasquantino, the taxes owed to Venezuela, on the income earned by a Venezuelan
national, are property of the Venezuelan government. Since this Venezuelan citizen has devised
a scheme to deprive the Venezuelan government of property (taxes due), and carried out the
scheme in the United States through the use of the wires, she could be subject to prosecution in
the United States.
A..

New Possibilities for Fighting Foreign Tax Fraud
As in Pasquantino, this prosecution could begin through an investigation by U.S.

authorities sua sponte, 131 or through a tip, or in response to a request for investigation by the
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Venezuelan government. It is established that she engaged in the activities of opening the
account and the investment of the funds through the use of interstate wires with the intent to
evade Venezuelan taxes. To establish that the conduct indeed deprived Venezuela of property
due, the government simply would have to produce someone familiar with the Venezuelan
revenue code, although apparently not necessarily an expert. This witness, would simply state
that taxes were owed to the Venezuelan government on the underlying activities, and the
Pasquantino requirements would have been fulfilled. At this point, the United States Department
of Justice could bring the prosecution. However, the discussion of whether to do so raises
complex political issues.
This problem is not restricted to individuals. Corporations (both domestic and
international) often engage in operations designed to minimize their tax exposure, 132 which, if
pursued too aggressively, might constitute evasion of taxes due in their country of origin.
Alternatively, the U.S. government and, in this hypothetical, the Venezuelan government
have other legal tools that they might use to deal with such conduct. For example Venezuela
might seek to prosecute the individual 133 under Venezuelan law. If the potential defendant were
located within the United States territory, Venezuela could seek extradition under the relevant
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Avi-Yonah, supra note 12, at 1587 (“much of the income earned by multinationals from cross-border transactions
is likely to escape the income tax altogether.”).
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parallel to the revenue rule for adding recognition and enforcement of penal judgments.

6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 271 (2006)

extradition treaty. 134 Tax evasion is not explicitly covered by the treaty, but Venezuela might
charge some kind of fraud, which is one of the enumerated crimes of Article II of the treaty. 135
In summary, there are several different possible avenues under which this conduct could
be punished. The propriety and/or availability of these may depend on where the defendant is
located. If she is in the United States, the U.S. Government either could prosecute under
Pasquantino or, if extradition is sought by Venezuela, could extradite. As noted below, the U.S.
would have to assess the political implications prior to acting in either way. Conversely, if the
defendant is captured in Venezuela, the case would be prosecuted there in accordance with local
laws, or a civil action could be commenced in Venezuela. A third option might be a civil RICO
action in the U.S. by the Venezuelan government, but as discussed below, this option might be
ineffective.
B.

Political Implications
A problem would arise when a country seeks to have the United States bring a

Pasquantino-type prosecution, but such a decision is in conflict with the foreign policy interests
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of the United States. 136 As an example, we will use again Venezuela, which after the election of
Hugo Chavez as president, has taken a position antagonistic to the U.S. 137
Given the political climate in Venezuela, there has been a strong opposition movement,
which the Chavez regime characterizes as “terrorist” and “rebel.” Moreover, some monetary
support has flowed from the United States to some of these opposition groups, especially those
that have monitored recent elections to ensure their fairness. This in turn has prompted
vociferous complaints from the Venezuelan government, claiming that such funding constitutes
meddling into the internal affairs of the country, and/or plotting to destabilize the government. 138
Additionally, the Chavez regime has charged the United States with involvement in a coup to
overthrow Chavez and with trying to destabilize the Chavez government. 139 A further example
of the conflict between enforcement of the law and foreign relations is the case of PosadaCarrilles. Venezuela sought his extradition but a U.S. judge denied his extradition based on the
possible torture that Posada-Carriles would suffer if extradited. 140
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Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 125 S.Ct. 694, 704 (2005) (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
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The executive branch has the authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations. 141 It is also the
branch that must decide what matters to prosecute. 142 “A prosecutor is invested with
inquisitorial powers and where he is informed that a crime has been committed, but no complaint
has been made, it is his duty to inquire into the facts, with care and accuracy, examining the
available evidence, the law and the facts, and the applicability of each to the other . . . .” 143 “In a
proper case it is his duty to take the initiative in commencing prosecution, but he will not be
compelled to prosecute a complaint except when the failure to prosecute constitutes an abuse of
discretion.” 144
This discretion regarding which cases to prosecute could lead to further deterioration of
bilateral relations with a country like Venezuela. It is not inconceivable that Venezuela could
request the prosecution of its opposition leaders if Venezuela had probable cause to believe that
those leaders had engaged in tax evasion reachable under Pasquantino. 145 The U.S. might refuse
to conduct such prosecutions as it would go against its foreign policy and interests in the region.
Such failure to prosecute could in turn be construed as discriminatory by Venezuela, particularly
if it saw the U.S. bringing similar prosecutions against some of its officials and high-ranking
military officers for other reasons, such as drug-related offenses. 146 Venezuela also could
perceive discrimination if it observed a pattern of initiating such prosecutions in regards to tax
141
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evasion by citizens of States with whom the United States enjoys good diplomatic relations, such
as Canada, Colombia or Brazil. 147
However, the type of crimes prosecuted under Pasquantino might be restricted to cases in
which the tax laws of the foreign country are to a certain extent compatible with the United
States. Foreign countries’ laws creating certain civil obligations or even government rights to
invade private property that are incompatible with those of the United States might not be
recognized under Small v. United States. 148 In Small, the defendant was prosecuted in the United
States for “unlawful gun possession,” because he had been convicted of a felony in Japan.149
The court there recognized that some countries might punish certain conduct that U.S. law would
permit and that society might encourage. 150 It is not inconceivable, then, that certain countries
could create obligations that are “inconsistent with an American understanding of fairness” 151
precluding perhaps a Pasquantino-type prosecution. 152 Thus, there would be a need for both the
prosecution and the court to determine whether the foreign law is so egregious, discriminatory,
and/or confiscatory to preclude enforcement under Small. For example, laws that deprive of
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property without due process or discriminate based upon race, 153 political views, 154 or any other
standard that violates equal protection might not be enforced.
Another hypothetical scenario can be used to illustrate the point above. A Venezuelan
citizen, belonging to the political opposition, owns land in Venezuela. President Chavez’s land
reform is being used to appropriate land belonging to members of his opposition. The landowner
is located in the United States for fear of personal attacks, and from there, using interstate wires,
arranges for the land to be placed under someone else’s name to prevent confiscation. She has
circumvented a Venezuelan law using interstate wires, but this law might be found
discriminatory, precluding prosecution in the United States under the previously-discussed
theories.
C.

Pasquantino and RICO Claims
Although, the Supreme Court left the issue of civil RICO claims unresolved, 155 the

Second Circuit recently dealt with this question in The European Community v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc. 156 That case was a consolidation of separate actions commenced by the European
Community, various of its member states and Colombia. 157 The complaints included claims that
the tobacco companies directed and facilitated the smuggling of contraband cigarettes into these
153
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States. 158 “The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had participated in a smuggling enterprise
within the meaning of RICO and committed various predicate acts of racketeering, including
mail and wire fraud, money laundering and others.” 159 The plaintiffs argued that the revenue
rule had been abrogated in the context of civil RICO claims when the USA Patriot Act 160
amended RICO in 2001. “The Patriot Act added certain smuggling or export control violations
to the list of RICO predicate acts.” 161 The district court rejected the argument and held that
“neither the amendments nor their legislative history evidence Congress’s intent to abrogate the
revenue rule to allow claims such as the plaintiff’s.” 162
The plaintiffs also argued that Pasquantino had significantly narrowed the scope of the
revenue rule. Again, the RJR Nabisco Court disagreed, holding that “the involvement of the
United States government was a key factor in determining the outcome of Pasquantino.” 163 The
RJR Nabisco lawsuit, by contrast, was brought by foreign governments and the United States
gave no signal that it wished to see this litigation proceed. 164 Therefore, according to RJR
Nabisco, it appears that so long as the action is criminal and the executive branch is involved,
these types of actions will be permitted. 165 “As we held in Canada, "[w]hat matters is not the
form of the action, but the substance of the claim." 166 Here, the substance of the claim is that the
defendants violated foreign tax laws. "When a foreign nation appears as a plaintiff in our courts
seeking enforcement of its revenue laws, the judiciary risks being drawn into issues and disputes
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of foreign relations policy that are assigned to--and better handled by--the political branches of
government." 167 In Pasquantino, this concern was alleviated by the direct participation of the
political branches in the litigation. 168 Here we have no such assurance. “We therefore see no
reason why Pasquantino's analysis should disturb our conclusion that the revenue rule bars civil
RICO suits by foreign governments against smugglers.” 169
CONCLUSION
The increased globalization of the world in which we live in has been accompanied by a
number of crimes that transcend borders, such as drug-trafficking, terrorism, money laundering,
and tax evasion. The Pasquantino decision has provided not only the U.S. government, but also
some of its allies, with tools to help combat the deprivation of their coffers of tax revenue when
the conduct has taken place within the U.S. borders and through the use of interstate wires.
However, given the requirements to commence such prosecution, Pasquantino’s impact is rather
modest, and the traditional tools to combat these crimes remain viable.
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